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I
INTRODUCTION

In 1981-82, the United States imposed a set of far-reaching extraterritorial
restraints on sales of oil and gas transmission equipment and technology to
the Soviet Union in an effort to prevent or delay completion of the Yamal
natural gas pipeline.' This action touched off the most violent dispute over
extraterritoriality in the history of American trade controls. 2 Since that time,
numerous law review articles 3 and speeches, 4 a few legal briefs, 5 and even a
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1. The most controversial controls were imposed in June 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 379, 385). A more limited set of controls had been imposed in
December 1981. See 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 399). For a
description of the two sets of controls, see Abbott, Defining the ExtraterritorialReach of American Export
Controls: Congress as Catalyst, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79, 82-87 (1984).
2. For detailed summaries of the pipeline episode, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 82-90; 3 A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, ch. II, §§ 5.4-5.6
(2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW]; Moyer & Mabry, Export
Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 60-91 (1983).

3. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 1, at 82-90; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 60-91; Butler, The
ExtraterritorialReach of the United States Export Administration Act, 1983 J. Bus. L. 275; Bridge, The Law
and Politics of United States Foreign Policy Export Controls, 4 LEGAL STUD. 2 (1984); Ellicott, Extrateritorial
Trade Controls-Law, Policy and Business, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1983 (1984); Lowe, Public International Law and the Conflict of Laws: The
European Response to the United States Export Administration Regulations, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 515
(1984); Morse & Powers, U.S. Export Controls and Foreign Entities: The Unanswered Questiois of Pipeline
Diplomacy, 23 VA.J. INT'L L. 537 (1983); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administration Act of
1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1983); Note, Extratenitorial
Application of United States Law: The Case of Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (1984); Perlow, Taking
Peacetime Trade Sanctions to the Limit: The Soviet Pipeline Embargo, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Dam, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts ofJurisdiction, and United States Foreign Policy, Address
to American Society of International Law (Apr. 15, 1983); Havers, Good Fences Made Good NVeighbors: 4
Discussion of Problems Concerning the Exercise ofJurisdiction, Address to American Bar Ass'n, Section of
Int'l Law and Practice (Aug. 2, 1983), reprinted in 17 INT'L L. 784 (1983); Secretary of State Shultz,
Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, Address to South Carolina Bar Ass'n (May 5, 1984),
reprinted in 84 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1984, at 33.

5. See, e.g., Motion to Vacate Temporary Denial of Export Privileges and Mlemorandum in Support, In re
Dresser, No. 632 (U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Aug. 27,
1982); Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of Commerce, In re Dresser, No. 632 (U.S.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration 1982); Motion to Vacate Order
Temporarily Denying Export Privileges and Memorandum in Support, In reJohn Brown Engineering
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judicial opinion6 have discussed what the Attorney-General of the United
7
Kingdom called the "pipeline fiasco."
Most of these writings deal with the extraterritoriality issue by testing the
validity of the American controls against what are presented as the accepted
rules of international law regarding national prescriptive jurisdiction. 8 These
rules are applied either directly or as constraints on the interpretation of the
Export Administration Act (EAA), 9 the statute under which the controls were
imposed.l 0 Some writings discuss the "reasonableness" principle set forth in
section 403 of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law,'' or its
predecessor, the "comity" principle expressed in section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, 12 as a limit on
extraterritorial controls. 13 The predominant approach, however, is to focus
on the "minimum bases of jurisdiction to prescribe law"1 4 -territoriality,
nationality, and, to a lesser extent, the protective principle-set out in section
402 of the Restatement (Revised), as the principles of law by which the
15
validity of the pipeline regulations should and can be judged.
Limited, No. 635 (U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration Oct. 1, 1982);
European Communities, Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 891-904 (1982) [hereinafter EC Comments].
6. Compagnie Europeene de Petroles v. Sensor Nederland, No. 82/716 (Dist. Ct., the Hague,
Sept. 13, 1984), reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 66 (1983).

7. See Havers, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, supra note 4, at 24.
8. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 3, at 280-82; Bridge, supra note 3, at 7-17; Morse & Powers, supra
note 3, at 557-67; Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of EAA, supra note 3, at 1315-34; Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law, supra note 3, at 366-89; Perlow, supra note 3, at 267-77; Dresser
Memorandum, supra note 5, at 70-87; John Brown Memorandum, supra note 5, at 23-29; Brief of U.S.
Department of Commerce, supra note 5, at 44-51. See also Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theoy, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439
(1981); Feldman, The Restructuring of National Security Controls under the 1985 Amendments to the Expoit
AdministrationAct:. MultilateralDiplomacy and the ExtraterritorialApplication of Lnited States Law, 21 STAN. J.
INT'L

L. 235 (1985).

9. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1982)). The pipeline controls were imposed under the foreign policy section
of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. § 2405 (1982).
10. Aside from procedural due process, the principal argument made by the firms sanctioned for
non-compliance with the pipeline controls in their legal actions challenging the temporary denial
orders imposed against them was that the 1982 regulations exceeded the President's authority under
the EAA, in that the statute must be construed consistently with international law, if at all possible,
and the regulations were contrary to international law. See Ellicott, supra note 3, at 22-26.
Many of the articles cited in note 3 also consider arguments that the controls went beyond the
congressional intent as to the extraterritorial reach of the EAA. See. e.g., Morse & Powers, supra note
3, at 544-56; Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the EAA, supra note 3, at 1311-14; Perlow, supra note 3,
at 258-67.

11.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403 (Tent.

Draft No. 7, 1984) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 7].
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
13. See, e.g., Morse & Powers, supra note 3, at 564-67; Note, Extiateiitorial.4pplicationof the EAA,
supra note 3, at 1331-34, EC Comnients, supra note 5, at 893-903.
14. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment
a (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6].
15. Id. § 402.
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The "minimum bases" approach may be appropriate for briefs and judicial
decisions,' 6 but it is somewhat unsatifying in a scholarly article. 17 First, such a
positivistic approach does not reveal the sources of the extraterritoriality
dispute or its unusual intensity and persistence, and thus does not suggest
ways of resolving it. Second, this approach invokes, as if they were
unambiguous and clearly controlling, rules that are by no means clear,' 8 that
are unlikely to receive an authoritative interpretation, that are not
unanimously accepted as binding,' 9 and that have proven themselves unable
to resolve either the continuing controversy or the 1982 crisis.
This article will look at the extraterritoriality issue more broadly. The
perspective of the article is based in part on modern international relations
theory, 20 which, like much legal scholarship, has been strongly influenced by
economics. 2 ' Using this approach, the article will identify two general
problems in international politics-what might be called structural problems
of the international system-that are important in understanding the
positions of the two sides in the extraterritoriality controversy, their
emotional commitment to these positions, and even their legal arguments.
After considering these problems, the article will detail the inadequacies of
international legal doctrines currently available for dealing with themprimarily the rules on national prescriptive jurisdiction, but also certain other
principles of international law cited during the pipeline controversy. In the
process, the article will present some arguments favorable to the U.S. position
on extraterritorial trade controls, arguments rarely advanced in other
scholarly commentary. The article will then briefly review some post-1982
developments, suggest what the future may hold, and conclude with some
recommendations for defusing the extraterritoriality controversy. Because
the 1981-82 pipeline controls constitute the background against which
discussions of the issue must proceed, this article will begin by briefly
reviewing the coverage of those controls.
II
THE

1981-82

PIPELINE CONTROLS

The extraterritorial aspects of the pipeline controls can be divided into
two groups. First, the United States prohibited exports of controlled items to
See briefs and comments cited supra note 5; Sensor Nederland, supra note 6.
Admittedly, the same criticism can be levelled at one of this author's own efforts in this field.
See Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Polic Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 739, 842-43 (1981) [hereinafter Abbott, Linking Trade].
18. See infra text accompanying notes 143-83.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 118-42.
20. For a brief discussion of the types of theory on which I have principally relied, see Keohane,
Theory of o'orld Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 503, 528-32 (A. Finifter ed. 1983).
21. This author is currently at work on an article, tentatively entitled The Vodern Theory of
International Relations and International Law, that reviews this theory and examines its relevance to
international legal problems.
16.

17.
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the Soviet Union by foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of American firms. 2 2
Transactions by foreign subsidiaries had previously been restricted by the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations and other control programs instituted
under U.S. emergency legislation. 23 This was the first time, however, that
such transactions were restricted under the EAA, the basic legislative
24
authority for national security and foreign policy export controls.
Second, the United States restricted re-exports to the Soviet Union by
foreign buyers of controlled U.S.-origin equipment and technology 2 5 and, by
analogy, foreign exports of locally manufactured equipment that contained
controlled U.S.-origin parts, components, or materials or that was the "direct
product" of controlled U.S.-origin technology. 2 6 All of these re-export-type
controls applied even if the U.S.-origin products or technology on which
regulation was predicated had been exported before the controls were
imposed. 27 At least in the case of product-of-technology controls, which
previously had been applied only prospectively, and then only to foreign
22. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250, 27,252 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)). The restriction
extended to foreign corporations and other organizations "owned or controlled" by United States
corporations, citizens or residents, or other persons actually within the United States. Id.
23. See Thompson, United StatesJurisdictionover Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporateand InternationalLaw
Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319 (1983). Although the controls instituted under the emergency
statutes were for the most part originally imposed during hostilities or other incidents affecting
national security, many have remained in effect for decades since the incident that originally justified
them, and have for some time been justified on foreign policy grounds, not as emergency measures
in the literal sense. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.1 (1986) (North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba).
24. Congress amended the EAA to authorize extraterritorial controls only in 1977. See Abbott,
Linking Trade, supra note 17, at 746-47.
25. The restriction on re-exports was part of the December 1981 regulations discussed in note
1. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 79-86.
26. The restriction on the re-export of controlled U.S.-origin parts, components and materials
incorporated into end-products abroad was imposed in December 1981, but its applicability to
components previously exported from the United States was unclear. The December 1981 controls
also restricted prospectively the export from the United States of controlled technology. Under the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), this had the effect of automatically restricting any
subsequent licensees of such technology from exporting its direct products to the Soviet Union. The
June 1982 regulations extended both these restrictions to items and technologies that had already
been exported from the United States, greatly increasing their economic impact. See Abbott, supra
note 1, at 84-88. See also infra note 27.
27. The December 1981 regulations were explicitly retroactive, in the sense described in the
text, in their application to re-exports of controlled end products and technologies. Under the
general re-export provisions in the EAR, which became applicable when exports of gas transmission
equipment and technology were controlled, the need for a United States re-export authorization was
to be judged "at the time of re-export." It was unclear under the 1981 regulations whether the
restrictions on re-exports of parts, components, and materials were similarly retroactive, but the
1982 regulations explicitly made them so. See supra note 26.
The 1981 regulations restricting foreign exports of the direct products of controlled U.S.-origin
technologies were intended to operate prospectively, affecting only foreign firms that received such
technologies, in licensing transactions, for example, after the regulations came into effect. The 1982
regulations, however, extended the restriction to any prior recipient of U.S.-origin technologies of
the types controlled in 1981 if (1) its license agreement or a similar contract with its U.S. supplier
contained a commitment to abide by U.S. export control regulations, or (2) even in the absence of
such a commitment, if the U.S.-origin technology was the subject of a licensing agreement from a
"U.S. person," or if its use was subject to the payment of royalties or similar amounts to such a
person. See supra note 26; Abbott, supra note 1, at 84-87; Ellicott, supra note 3, at 8-11.
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licensees that had given "written assurances" of compliance, the retroactivity
28
feature was also unprecedented.
The Western allies of the United States vigorously protested these
controls. 2 9 Both Britain and France formally countermanded at least some of
30
them, leaving the affected firms subject to directly conflicting regulations.
When those firms complied, out of necessity, with the orders of the local
sovereign, the United States suspended their right to participate in further
export transactions. 3' Soon, however, the United States withdrew both the
controls and the penalties as part of a transparently one-sided settlement with
32
its European allies.
III
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COLLECTIVE GOODS

The first of the structural problems relevant to this controversy is the
difficulty of achieving international cooperation in a system of sovereign,
independent, and self-interested states when cooperative action is necessary
to achieve state goals. This is one of the most fundamental problems in
33
international politics.

Cooperation is certainly possible: An example from the field of trade
controls is the Coordinating Committee on strategic experts (COCOM), 34 the

informal international organization through which the Western industrial
countries coordinate their restrictions on high-technology exports to the
Soviet Union. To the extent that COCOM deals with products having direct
and significant military applications, however, it may reflect state preferences
that are relatively conducive to cooperation. 35 Those preferences seem to
28. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 95-96. The December 1981 regulations had followed the
traditional format, requiring subsequent licensees of controlled technologies to give "written
assurances" and restricting their exports of direct products of the technologies. See id. at 85-86.
29. See EC Comments, supra note 5.
30. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 294-96.
31. See id. at 296-300.
32. See id. at 300-06.
33. See, e.g., R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 5-11 (1984) [hereinafter R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]; Ove, Explaining
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Oye,
Explaining Cooperation]. Achieving cooperation in a world of independent egoists is a pervasive

problem of human society generally. See R.

AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

(1984).

34. For discussions of COCOM, see Berman & Garson, U7nited States Export Controls-Past, Present,
and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-42 (1967); Special Report of the President on Multilateral
Export Controls, reprinted in Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
52 (1978); Hunt, Mulilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of COCOA!, 14 U. TOL. L. REV.
1285 (1983); Comment, COCOA: Limitations on the Effectiveness of Multilateral Export Controls. 1983
WISC. INT'L L.J. 106; Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A CriticalStudy of the CoCom
Regime, 9 FLETCHER F. 105, 117-24 (1985).
For a discussion of the means of achieving international cooperation in the context of U.S.European differences on East-West trade, see Crawford & Lenway, Decision .MIodes and International
Regime Change: W1estern Collaboration on East-lWest Trade, 37 WORLD POL. 375 (1985).
35. See Mastanduno, Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union, 37
WORLD POL. 503, 525 (1985).
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correspond at least roughly to the game theory scenario known as Stag
Hunt.3 6 In the Stag Hunt game, the desired goal can only be achieved with
unanimous cooperation, and all of the players see unanimous cooperation as
the most desirable outcome. No player, however, will continue to cooperate if
even one other player defects, or appears likely to do so: it would then be
impossible to achieve the original goal, and continued cooperation might
hamper an individual player's pursuit of second-best goals.3 7 Cooperation
may thus break down, even though all of the players desire it, because of
uncertainty over others' likely courses of action.
In COCOM, the outcome favored by all the member states, at least
regarding products with direct and significant military applications, is a joint
embargo. Yet no member state, with the possible exception of the United
States, is prepared to restrict exports of such products if it believes, rightly or
wrongly, that another member state will export them in its stead. If the
Soviets are going to obtain the products in any event, one may as well
compete for the sale. Again, uncertainty can cause cooperation to break
down.
Since cooperation is the most desired outcome, however, as in Stag Hunt
situations generally, all that is needed to maintain cooperation is a mechanism
for providing satisfactory information about the intentions of the players.
With such a mechanism in place, each player has some reasonable assurance
that no other is likely to defect.3 8 Through its embargo lists and periodic
consultation procedures, COCOM continuously provides all member states
with current, reliable information as to the items that others are willing to
39
embargo, thus allowing the desired cooperation.
In many areas, however-including the control of exports beyond those
with direct military applications-international cooperation is much more
40
difficult to achieve, even among states having more or less common goals.
The transaction costs of international bargaining are high; 4 1 there are severe
information problems; 4 2 and, as OPEC has discovered, there are often
powerful incentives pulling against cooperation, even at the expense of
optimal results. These incentives are often illustrated by the famous game
theory scenario known as the Prisoners' Dilemma, a scenario !ess conducive to
36. For discussions of the Stag Hunt game, see Oye, Explaining Cooperation, snpra note 33, at 8;
Jervis, Cooperation Under the Secnrity Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167 (1978). The Stag Hunt senario was
originated by Rousseau. See Oye, Explaining Cooperation, supra note 33, at 8 n.16.
37. The preference ordering of the players in a Stag Hunt game, then, is as follows: (1) Mutual
cooperation; (2) defecting while others continue to cooperate; (3) mutual noncooperation; and
(4) continuing to cooperate while others defect. See Oye, Explaining Cooperation, supra note 33, at 8.
38. Arthur Stein refers to Stag Hunt as the "assurance game." See Stein, Coodiiation and
Collaboration.- Regimes in an Anarchic Iforld, 36 INT'L ORG. 299, 302-04 (1982).
39. See Mastanduno, Strategies of Economic Containment, supra note 35, at 525.
40. See Axelrod & Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies aid Institutions, 38
WORLD POL. 226 (1985).
41.

See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 33, at 18.

42.

See id. at 18, 82-83.
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cooperation than Stag Hunt. 4 3 The best example of that scenario is the
44
production of collective goods (CGs).
A CG has two defining characteristics. First, it can be used or consumed
by any number of persons-or states-without reducing the amount available
for others. 4 5 Second, states that do not contribute toward the cost of
producing the good cannot feasibly be prevented from using it.46 When
contributions toward the cost of producing such a good are voluntary, each
state has a strong incentive to free-ride, that is, to disguise its true preference
for the good, hope that others will contribute enough to produce it, and enjoy
it once they do. 4 7 The results typically create a sense of unfairness, in that less
of the good gets produced than is actually desired, and the free-riders profit
48
more than those who ante up.
Within domestic society, these problems normally lead us to shun reliance
on voluntary contributions for the production of important CGs like national
defense. Rather, we mandate more or less equitable contributions, in the
form of taxes, toward the cost of those CGs that our legislatures decide
should be produced. 49 In the decentralized international system, however,
this approach is not normally feasible, and the problem of cooperation in the
50
production of CGs must be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

States, like persons, can have different preferences for the same good.
Some may value it highly while others do not want it produced at all. 5 1 States
that genuinely oppose the production of a good and refuse to contribute
toward it are not free-riding. Unfortunately, in the real world it is often
43. There are many situations in international politics where states face incentives to act in ways
that appear to be in their own interest, but which in fact-when all states follow the same
incentives-produce less than optimal results for the group of states and for individual state actors.
International relations theorists often model these situations using the Prisoners' Dilemma matrix.
See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 33, at 6-8; Stein, supra note 38; Snyder, "'Prisoner's
Dilemma" and "Chicken " Models in International Politics, 15 INT'L STUD. Q 66 (1971); Conybeare, Public
Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the InternationalPolitical Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5 (1984).
The preference ordering of each player, or state, in a Prisoners' Dilemma game is as follows:
(1) Defecting from the cooperative course of action while others are restraining themselves;
(2) mutual cooperation; (3) mutual noncooperation; (4) restraining oneself while others are
defecting. See Oye, Explaining Cooperation, supra note 33, at 7-8.
44. See Russett & Sullivan, Collective Goods and InternationalOrganization, 25 INT'L ORG. 845 (197 1).
45. This quality is referred to asjointness of supply or nonrivalry in consumption. See W. RIKER
& P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 260 (1973); Conybeare, supra
note 43, at 6. Most jointly supplied goods exhibit some degree of rivalry, however.
46. This quality is referred to as non-excludability. Excludability is rarely if ever impossible in
principle, merely costly and difficult. See Snidal, Public Goods, Property Rights and Political Organizations,
23 INT'L STUD. Q 532, 540-41 (1979). The devices by which states try to prevent noncontributors
from sharing in a CG are of particular interest in world politics. See id. at 539.
47. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 45, at 250-52; Conybeare, supra note 43, at 6.
48. See W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 45, at 247, 250-52; Conybeare, supra note 43, at 6.
The incentives facing potential beneficiaries of a CG are essentially those of the Prisoners' Dilemma
game. See supra note 43; Conybeare, supra note 43, at 8.
49. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 15-18 (1979).
50. See Russett & Sullivan, supra note 44, at 846, 850-59.
51. An obvious example is a strategic weapons system, belonging, say, to the United States.
This system may be a CG for the citizens of the United States and for the members of NATO, but it is
clearly not a CG for the USSR and the states of the Warsaw Pact. See Russett & Sullivan, supra note
44, at 848.
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difficult to distinguish between free-riding and honest opposition. 52 States
can perceive free-riding in others when it does not really exist, and fail to
recognize it when it does.
As students of international politics have long realized, the relations
among the states of the Western alliance fit neatly into this theoretical
scheme. 53 The United States sees itself as the leader of the West. 5 4 It takes a
more activist and moralist position on many issues than do its allies 5 5-which

this article will refer to generically as "Europe." It often takes unilateral
actions as a way of asserting its leadership and encouraging other states to
cooperate. 56 Because of its vast economic power, the United States relies
heavily on economic sanctions. 57 As Europe has become stronger, however,
its cooperation in sanctions and other activist measures has become
58
essential.
52. Because of this difficulty, actors who wish to benefit from a CG without contributing toward
it are often able to disguise or hide their preference for the good. See Conybeare, supra note 43, at 6;
D. MUELLER, supra note 49, at 25-26, 68.
53. Some of the earliest studies of CG's focused on international alliances. See e.g., Olson &
Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 REV. OF EcON. & STATISTICS 3 (1966), repinted in B.
RussErr, ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 25-45 (1968). Olson and Zeckhauser
sought to explain why the United States bore a disproportionate share of the costs of the NATO
alliance, even though Europe was closer to the "front" and less able to defend itself independently.
Their analysis demonstrated that, whenever the products of an alliance are CG's, the nation that
places the highest absolute value on them will bear a disproportionate share of their costs, except in
a true emergency, and suboptimal amounts will be produced. Olson and Zeckhauser were careful to
observe that this result flows from the national interests of the parties to the alliance, not from any
moral failing, such as a tendency to cheat. Thus, moral suasion of the smaller members is
inappropriate, and is likely to be ineffective and create resentment. The large nation, moreover, is
typically limited in its ability to force larger contributions, because its threat to drop out of the
alliance is usually hollow. See id.
As NATO has come to produce more conventional defense, which can be appropriated to a
particular member country more easily than strategic defense, the products of the alliance have come
to include more private and fewer collective goods, and the smaller alliance members have increased
their proportionate contributions. See Cornes & Sandier, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods,
94 ECON. J. 580 (1984).
54. See Secretary of State Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at
34 ("As the largest free nation, the United States must use the full range of tools at its disposal to
meets its responsibility for preserving peace and defending freedom.").
55. The difference has led to popular caricature of the U.S. and European positions, perhaps
best captured by The Economist, which paints Europe as a diminutive businessman holding a briefcase
and a daffodil-"Pale Ebenezer"--and the United States as a muscular cowboy holding a smoking
revolver-"Roaring Bill." Bill and Ebenezer, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1986, at 13.
56. Such unilateral actions are a common strategem of alliance leaders and "hegemonic" states.
In addition to highlighting a common problem and setting an example, unilateral action
demonstrates the leader's commitment to the cause, assuring other governments that they will not,
for example, be left restricting potentially lucrative trade opportunities for their firms while the
leader's firms continue trading with the target. See Crawford & Lenway, supra note 34, at 380-81. It is
of course frustrating to the leader to convey this assurance through costly unilateral action and then
find that no other states are cooperating. This is a version of the collective goods problem.
57. See G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 7, 13-20 (1985) (United
States was involved in fully two thirds of all uses of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes
since World War I).
58. In the case of export controls, the economic strength of Europe and other countries is
reflected in the pervasive problem of "foreign availability" of controlled goods and technologies. See
Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 17, at 800-10. For a discussion of the importance of multilateral
cooperation in export controls, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 158-61.
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It is fair to say that the United States is often frustrated 59 by its inability to
obtain this cooperation on what seem to be matters of common interest. 60
One recent and controversial example occurred following the 1986 bombing
of Libya by U.S. forces, an action widely deplored in Europe. 6 1 "Senior
American officials" said that the bombing might not have been necessary had
Europe been willing to cooperate in economic sanctions against the Qadaffi
government, rather than leaving the United States to deal unilaterally with
62
that government's support of terrorism.
The United States perceives this lack of international cooperation, both in
the Libyan case and more generally, as a CG problem. In its view, virtually all
American export controls, at least to the extent they are successful, produce
CGs: weakening the Soviet Union militarily, 6 3 for example, or placing a cost
on and thus deterring aggression (as in Afghanistan), 64 the seizure of
diplomats (as in Iran)," 5 or the support of terrorism (as with Libya). 6 6 Europe
benefits from these effects along with the United States, but refuses to join in
significant multilateral controls. 67 Viewed in this way, Europe is free-riding
59. See, e.g., Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120
(1985) (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1982)) ("Availability to controlled countries of goods and
technology from foreign sources is a fundamental concern of the United States and should be
eliminated through negotiations and other appropriate means whenever possible.").
60. When allies are dependent on the protection of an alliance leader, they may be willing to
cooperate with the leader's program, even if it is to some extent inconsistent with their interests, out
of fear of abandonment. In the current world situation, however, Europe has little fear of being
abandoned by the United States, and it is relatively free to dissociate itself from American policies
with which it disagrees and to try to restrain American actions. See Snyder, The Security Dilemma in
Alliance Politics, 36 WORLD POL. 461, 483-85 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Bill and Ebenezer, supra note 55, at 13 ("Nothing has so vehemently separated
America from Europe since 1945.").
62. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, § A, at 11, col. 1. American officials and private commentators alike had criticized European reluctance to cooperate in sanctions in the weeks leading up
to the bombing. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1986, § A, at 1, col. 3; Apr. 8, 1986, § A, at 31, col. 5;
Apr. 13, 1986, § IV, at 2, col. 3.
63. This is, in an oversimplified statement, the aim of U.S. national security controls under § 5
of the EAA. Section 5(a)(l), 50 U.S.C. § 2404(a)(1) (1982), authorizes the President to control
exports in implementation of the policy laid out in § 3(2)(a). Section 3(2)(a), 50 U.S.C. § 2402(2)(a)
(1982), states that it is the policy of the United States to restrict exports of goods and technology that
would "make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country which would
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States." See also 50 U.S.C. § 2404(d) (1982)
(Section 5(d) requires the Executive branch to limit national security controls, to the maximum
extent consistent with the purposes of the EAA, to "militarily critical goods and technologies,"
defined to include certain types of equipment and know-how "which, if exported, would permit a
significant advance in a military system" of a controlled country.).
64. For a description of the economic sanctions employed by the United States following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see 3 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 2, at
233-67; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 27-60.
65. For a description of the economic sanctions employed by the United States following the
seizure of the United States embassy in Iran, see 3 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW,
sipra note 2, at 539-621; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 8-27.
66. For a description of the economic sanctions employed by the United States against Libya for
its support of international terrorism, see Ellicott, The United States Embargo on Trade and Financial
Dealings with Libya, 2 INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. REP. 17 (1986); Bialos &Juster, The Libyan Sanctions: A
Rational Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 799 (1986); ABBOTr, Economic Sanctions
and State-Sponsored Terrorism, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 1987).
67. Europe did impose sanctions on Iran during the hostage crisis, but these were widely seen in
the United States as too limited to be of great effect. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 15-20.
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on the American controls and profiting unfairly; 68 perhaps even more
importantly, the allies are undermining the production of essential CGs.
Europe sees the situation much differently. It views itself not as freeriding, but as having different preferences from those of the United States.
Sometimes, it argues, it opposes creation of the "good" which the United
States seeks to produce, as in the case of the pipeline. 69 In such a situation,
even unilateral American sanctions, to the extent they have any effect, create
what is from Europe's point of view a "collective bad" or "negative
externality"-the sort of economic effect usually illustrated by a factory
belching smoke and pollution into surrounding neighborhoods. 70 Europe has
no interest in cooperating in such a case; a joint embargo would bring about
Europe's least favored outcome, a complete reversal of the cooperative Stag
Hunt scenario. 7 ' Even more frequently, Europe alleges, it opposes the use of
trade controls as the means of producing international goods, because given
their cost, they are ineffective or even counterproductive. 72 On this score too,
Europe resists cooperation. And if states like Britain, France, and West
Germany disagree with the United States over the desirability of certain
"goods" and the means of producing them, even greater opposition is likely
73
among states that share fewer common interests with the United States.
These differences of perception lie behind many of the disputes in the
export control area: over the coverage of COCOM controls, over cooperation
in foreign policy controls, and in part, over extraterritorial controls.
American frustration over what it sees as free-riding, in particular, results in
periodic efforts to coerce European cooperation, as under the Battle Act;7 4 to
68. The same complaint is often addressed to Europe and Japan in connection with the sharing
of defense costs. See supra note 53.
69. To be clear, the good which the United States sought to produce through the use of
sanctions was preventing or delaying completion of the pipeline, as a means of avoiding European
dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of energy, preventing the Soviets from earning hard
currency from natural gas exports, and other results of the project which it thought undesirable.
Europe, on the other hand, generally favored the pipeline as a way to diversify its energy sources
away from the Middle East, establish commercial links with the Soviets, and not incidentally provide
jobs for European economies. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 2, at
273-91.
70. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960).
71. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Mutual cooperation-a joint embargo-would
ensure that the pipeline would not be built and would prevent Europe from making any related
export sales. Europe's most favored outcome would be either (a) mutual noncooperation, that is, no
embargo by either the United States or Europe, or (b) a unilateral embargo by the United States.
The latter would be preferred if the United States could not restrict enough crucial components to
stop the pipeline by itself-the pipeline would be built and Europe would make all the related export
sales-while the former would be preferred if it could.
72. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 2, at 290 (quoting Andre
Fontaine, editor-in-chief of Le Monde; Root, Trade Controls That Work, 56 FOR. POL. 61 (1984);
Mastanduno, supra note 35, at 517-29 (1985).
73. Even some states in Europe may have sufficiently divergent interests that they frequently
differ over the desirability of particular political goods. The leading example is Switzerland, which is
agressively neutral on nearly all issues of international politics. See Hoechner A Swiss Perspective on
Conflicts ofJurisdiction, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 271.
74. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 213, §§ 101-05, 202-03, 30135, 65 Stat. 644 (repealed 1979). The Battle Act authorized the State Department to terminate
military and economic assistance to any nation that did not cooperate in the U.S. embargo of the
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purchase such cooperation, as by offering contracts to foreign firms whose
home governments agree to restrict technology sales to the East; 7 5 or simply
to demand cooperation, as the 1985 amendments to the EAA seem to require
76
the President to do.

As they are in every social group, such deep-seated differences between
nations will be difficult to bridge. While they persist the extraterritoriality
dispute will be very difficult to resolve. Perhaps the best suggestion, though
hardly an earthshaking one, is to increase the level of consultation among the
allies, preferably within established organizations, on relevant issues. First,
more extensive consultations should be held on the foreign policy issues
underlying incidents like Libya and the pipeline. Technically, such
consultations are already the policy of the United States, or at least of the
Department of State. 77 Separate consultations, perhaps, should be held on
78 The
economic sanctions and alternate means of implementing policy.
information provided by the consultations might help the United States
recognize when Europe has genuinely different preferences, and conducting
the consultations within institutions that Europe values might reduce its
incentive to distort its preferences.7 9 These consultations, however, are
unlikely to solve the problem completely.
IV
MOBILE RESOURCES AND THE STATIC STATE

The second structural problem underlying the extraterritoriality debate is
the gap between the way the international community defines the statestatically, by reference to fixed geographical boundaries 8 °-and the highly
mobile nature of a state's resources.
Soviet Union. It was repealed in 1979 as obsolete by the Export Administration Act of 1979. 50
U.S.C. § 2416(e) (1982).
75. See Crawford & Lenway, supra note 34, at 381.
76. Section 5 of the EAA, 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (1982), requires the President to negotiate with the
other member states of COCOM with a view toward accomplishing certain specified objectives. In
the 1979 version, the broadest such objective was the reduction in the scope of COCOM controls to
a level acceptable to and enforceable by all member governments. Id. The Export Administration
Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 59, amended this section by striking out the objective just
described and adding six new ones, all relating to the strengthening of COCOM controls, e.g., to
"improve the International Control List and minimize the approval of exceptions to that list,
strengthen enforcement and cooperation in enforcement efforts, provide sufficient funding for the
Committee, and improve the structure and function of the Secretariat.
50 U.S.C. § 2404(i)(5)
(1982).
77. See Dam, Extraterritorialtvy, Conflicts ofJuisdiction, and United States Foreign Pohcy, supra note 4, at
16-22 (When disputes over jurisdiction are grounded in disputes over policy, the most effective
solution is to harmonize policy. The United States will seek to resolve the policy differences that
underlie many jurisdictional conflicts.); Secretary of State Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 36 (outlining steps to avoid conflicts and minimize harm when
unavoidable conflicts do occur).
78. See Crawford & Lenway, supra note 34, at 386-87.
79. See id.at 386-87; Oye, supra note 33, at 17; Axelrod & Koehane, supra note 40, at 241; R.
KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 33, at 102.
80. See RESTATEMENT (REvisED) Draft No. 6, snpra note 14, § 201 ("Under international law, a
'state' is an entity which has a defined territory and permanent population, under the control of its
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The territory of a state is not valuable solely because of its sheer square
footage, but also, perhaps primarily, because it carries with it control over
resources, both tangible and intangible, that can be translated into wealth and
power."' Much the same can be said of population.8 2 While it is recognized
that a state may have a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of its
citizens even while they are abroad, 3 however, the state's interest in
preserving some control over resources dispersed abroad through commerce
and investment is not so clearly accepted.
The extraterritorial aspects of the U.S. export control system reflect that
interest by asserting a limited right to control certain resources that are-for
want of a better term-functionally associated with the United States, even
though they are physically outside its boundaries. In some cases, functional
links to the United States are inherent in the way the resources are used
abroad. In other cases, the United States must act to maintain functional links
that might otherwise be broken as resources leave its territory. 4 In both
situations, the aim of asserting control is to maximize the effectiveness of
unilateral American action, in a world where cooperation is difficult and allies
do not always follow the example of their leader, by mobilizing all the
resources associated with the state. In CG situations, more specifically, the
aim is to limit the extent to which resources associated with the United States
are used by others as instruments of free-riding.
The clearest example of inherent functional links is the controlled foreign
subsidiary of an American corporation.8 5 The heart of the foreign subsidiary
is a bundle of resources, including equity capital, technology, and managerial
know-how. These resources typically have been provided by the American
parent and transferred out of the United States. The subsidiary is usually
controlled from the United States by its parent, sometimes even on
operational details, and relies on frequent parental infusions of technical and
managerial information. The subsidiary's profits are normally mingled with
those of the entire enterprise, and are invested or remitted to the parent on its
own government, and which engages in, or has the capacity to engage in,formal relations with other
such entities.").
81. This statement owes much to the perspective set forth in MI. \IcDOUGAL & W.Mi. REISMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE:

THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITrY

432-34 (1981) (elaborated at 435-787).
82. See id. at 788-89.
83. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 402(2) ("Subject to § 403, a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... (2)the activities, status, interests or relations of
its nationals outside as well as within its territory.").
84. Cooper refers to the effort "to extend national control to the mobile factors wherever they
be" as the "agressive" response to greater economic interdependence, specifically the problems that
arise when the decisions of firms cover a wider geographic area than the jurisdiction of government.
Cooper, Economic Interdependence and Foreign Polic in the Seventies. 24 WORLD POE. 159, 168-70 (1972).
This is quite different from the other main source of extraterritoriality disputes, the assertion of
jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive acts that affect the allocation of resources within United
States territory.

85.

See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6 supra note 14, § 415(2).

See Abbott, snpra note 1, at 96-98.
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instructions. 8 6 While the foreign subsidiary certainly has important links with

its host country, almost always including local employees and sometimes
including local equity holders, 87 its links with the United States are significant
as well.
If foreign subsidiaries could escape American regulation entirely,
moreover, U.S. multinationals could free-ride on other American firms,
avoiding the impact of export controls or other forms of territorial regulation
simply by transferring resources out of U.S. territory. 8 8 Such transfers might
benefit the recipient states but could significantly reduce the economic power
of the United States thus reducing its ability to provide both private goods, of
value primarily to itself, and international collective goods.
In the case of goods and technology exported to independent foreign
firms, the United States attempts to maintain the functional links inherent in
American origin by imposing restrictive conditions on purchasers at the time
of the original sale. 89 The use of such restrictions, rather than any claim that
goods or technology have a continuing American "nationality"-a notion
enthusiastically demolished by numerous commentators 9°-appears to be the
basic justification for the array of re-export-type controls the United States
maintains. 9' In essence, the United States says: These resources comprise
important bases of our power, and they may be taken abroad only on the
conditions we set; if you breach those conditions, we will penalize you in
certain established ways. The rationale is even clearer when one considers
that in the great majority of export control enforcement cases, especially
those involving foreign firms, the only penalty invoked is a suspension of the
right to participate in further exports from the United States.' 2 Because of
this, the United States can usually be understood to say: If you breach the
86. See id. at 96-98. For a discussion that emphasizes the practical constraints on centralized
control of foreign subsidiaries at the level of routine management decisions, see D. VAGTI-S,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 111-14 (1986).
87. See D. VAGTS, supra note 86, at 113.
88. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 97-98, 109-10. As the term "free-riding" suggests, such transfers
are part of a separate CG problem internal to the United States.
89. See Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 5, at 48-50. See also
Feldman, supra note 8, at 264-65; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 8, at 440-41.
men/s,
90. See, e.g., Note, Extrater7itorial Application of the EAA, supra note 3, at 1324-25; EC Coom
supra note 5, at 894.
91. It must be admitted that the government has not made its justification for such controls
crystal-clear, and has advanced justifications other than the imposition of restrictive conditions in
specific contexts. In the Dresser (France) litigation, for example, the government argued that the use
by Dresser (France) of previously licensed U.S.-origin technology constituted a "continuing export",
which could, presumably, be regulated by the United States under the territorial principle. See
Defendent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order, at 225, Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982); Morse
& Powers, supra note 3, at 562 n. 118.
92. A classic case is Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 24 Fed. Reg. 2626 (1959), reprinlted inl 3 A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC LAW, supra note 2, at 30. Suspension of export privileges was
also the penalty invoked against foreign licensees shipping direct products of U.S.-origin technology
in violation of the 1982 pipeline regulations. See, e.g., Case 635, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,205 (1982) (order
temporarily denying export privileges toJohn Brown Engineering Ltd.). See RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 431 reporters' note 3.
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conditions we have established on the use of our resources, we will restrict
your ability to buy more.
Such conditions are sometimes expressly acknowledged, as in the "written
assurances" required of licensees. 93 Even where they are not acknowledged,
however, 9 4 the United States would argue that the purchase of American
exports with knowledge of the applicable conditions constitutes an implied
agreement to comply with them. 9 5 The same logic, it seems, would support
conditions stating that additional restrictions may be imposed in the future.
An example of such a condition is the U.S. regulation providing that the need
for authorization of a re-export is to be determined at the time of the
proposed transaction, not when the goods are first taken from the United
States. 9 6 In all such cases, foreign firms which are aware of the conditions can
bargain for a lower price, thus reducing not only the amount they themselves
must pay, but also, in most cases, the value of the resources their home states
97
must give up in exchange for U.S.-origin goods or technology.
The United States has not always acted in ways that are consistent with the
above rationale. The validity of consent, express or implied, turns on
adequate notice, and some of the retroactive 1982 restrictions, for example,
were by no means clearly authorized under prior regulations and practice. 9 8
American re-export restrictions, furthermore, purport to apply to any
subsequent holder of U.S.-origin items in a chain of ownership, although only
in a few instances are subsequent purchasers required explicitly to accept
them. 99
Finally, the "written assurances" required of many foreign
93. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1986). Even written assurances, however, are addressed to the U.S.
exporter and are not required to be phrased as express consents to American regulations. Id. A
clearer case of consent is the ultimate consignee and purchaser statement, a form addressed to the
U.S. Department of Commerce which many foreign importers must submit as part of an American
exporter's application for a validated license. See id. § 375.2. This form includes an explicit
undertaking not to re-export the items covered by the license, without approval, contrary to the U.S.
Export Administration Regulations. See Form ITA-629, Item 8, reprintedm P. RAY & E. HIRSCHHORN,
GUIDE TO EXPORT CONTROLS

(1987).

94. For a discussion of situations in which no foreign acknowledgement is required, see Abbott,
Linking Trade, supra note 17, at nn. 615-16 and accompanying text: Feldman, supra note 8, at 265-68.
95. See Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 5, at 49.
96. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.2(a), 376.12 note (1986).
97. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 139.
98. The principal offender was the 1982 restriction on sales of direct products of controlled
U.S.-origin technologies. All prior product-of-technology restrictions, including those imposed in
December 1981, applied only to foreign licensees that had given, at the time of the original
technology export, written assurances that they did not intend to export products of the technologies
to specified destinations to which exports from the United States were then controlled. See Abbott,
supra note 1, at 95-96. In addition, it was unclear, even after the December 1981 controls, whether
re-export controls on foreign-manufactured end products containing U.S.-origin components were
intended to be retroactive. See id. at 85.
99. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1986) purports to prohibit any person in a foreign country, not just the
original purchaser, from re-exporting without authorization "a commodity previously exported from
the United States." To bind subsequent purchasers, it would seem, the United States would have to
obtain their consent directly, or else require the original purchaser to impose a restrictive condition
on any purchaser from it, and so on down the chain. Applications for authority to re-export goods to
controlled countries and several other destinations where there is perceived to be a high risk of
diversion must include an ultimate consignee and purchaser statement provided by the buyer. See 15
C.F.R. § 374.3(c)(1) (1986); supra note 93. The consent of subsequent purchasers is not otherwise
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purchasers of U.S.-origin technology are not phrased as express consents to
American regulation and typically run to the American exporter rather than to
the United States itself.' 0 0 In principle, however, the rationale is clear, and
the regulations could easily be amended to conform more closely with it. One
would have thought, in fact, that amendments for just that purposemodifying, among other things, the recent regulations themselves, the
destination control notices required to be included on certain export
documents, and the undertakings required to be provided by purchaserswould have been made following the pipeline case.
It is important to note that in both the foreign subsidiary and the re-export
situations, the United States is only claiming what it sees (or says it sees) as a
right of unilateral action-a right to control resources functionally associated
with it, assimilating them to resources within its territory, for certain limited
purposes-even though it is motivated in part by concern over free-riding.
Some might argue that a state in the position of the United States should be
permitted to coerce free-riding states, or any firms operating as part of the
economies of such states, into optimal contributions toward the production of
international CGs. This, however, is not the position of the United States. Its
extraterritorial controls are not a reincarnation of the Battle Act' 0 '
instruments for coercing foreign governments into cooperating. Neither are
they efforts to force independent foreign firms to participate actively in its
embargoes, like the secondary aspects of the Arab boycott of Israel. 0 2 Not
even in the embargo regulations promulgated under its emergency laws has

the United States threatened to penalize any foreign firm that sells restricted
products to a target nation.' 0 3 The extended unilateral controls of the United
States may create negative externalities for other states, and that is
unfortunate, but even purely territorial acts may have that effect.

required, however-although some firms may include provisions restricting re-exports in their
contracts with distributors-so that frequently "the chain of commitment stops with the first reexport." Feldman, supra note 8, at 266.
100. See supra note 93. Documents required of some foreign purchasers of American goods,
The
however, do include explicit undertakings addressed to the United States Government.
principal examples are the ultimate consignee and purchaser statement, see supra note 93, and a
similar form required of foreign firms seeking qualification as consignees under certain special
export licenses. See Form ITA 6052, Item 9, reprinted in P. RAY & E. HIRSCHHORN, GUIDE TO EXPORT
CONTROLS (1987); Feldman, supra note 8, at 265-67.
101. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
102. For an analysis of the primary and secondary aspects of the Arab boycott and U.S.
analogues, see Steiner, International Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1367-70 (1976).
103. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.329-330 (1986) (prohibitions applicable only to persons
subject to jurisdiction of United States). It may be necessary to modify this statement, however, if
Congress approves legislation-passed by the Senate as this article went to press-restricting
American imports of products of Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik as a sanction for
those firms' exports of foreign-origin products and technology to the Soviet Union in violation of
their own national laws, adopted pursuant to COCOM rules, and making such sanctions mandatory
in similar future cases. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. § 10249 (daily edJuly 21,
1987) (§§ 1031-32) (adoption by Senate).
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Europe does not accept the notion of functionally associated resources,, 04
especially the idea of creating links by private consent, 10 5 any more than it
accepts the American CG analysis.1 6 On this score Europe probably feels
that the United States is the disingenuous one.
Europe adheres to the more traditional static notion of the state, under
which resources that freely enter a state's territory become part of that state's
power base (at least, in the case of direct investment, if there is local
incorporation).' 0 7 It bases its legal argument primarily on the territorial
principle of jurisdiction, 10 8 which is part and parcel of the traditional notion
that principle "divides the world into compartments, within each of which a
foreign state has jurisdiction."'' 0 9 These positions seem consistent with
European national interests if one accepts the apparent facts that Europe is
less activist than the United States, 10° more reliant on international
commerce, and more often the recipient than the source of sensitive goods,
technology, and investment.
Because Europe rejects the idea of functional links, it tends to see
extraterritorial trade controls not as unilateral action, but as a way of coercing
its cooperation and that of its firms.'" In economic terms, Europe sees such
controls as a form of taxation, forcing it to devote some of its resources to the
production of "goods" it may not even want.' 1 2 It views the United States as
104. In its Comments on the 1982 pipeline regulations, the EC asserted that the U.S. measures
were contrary to international law because their extraterritorial aspects were not consistent with "the
two generally accepted bases ofjurisdiction in international law, the territoriality and the nationality
principles." It contended that the nationality principle did not support jurisdiction over foreignincorporated companies, regardless of the presence of "some corporate link (parent-subsidiary) or
personal link (e.g. shareholding) to the U.S.;" and regardless of any "tie to a U.S.-incorporated
company .. . through a licencing agreement, royalty payments, or payment of other compensation,
or because they have bought certain goods originating in the U.S." EC Comments, supra note 5, at 89394.
105. See id. at 895-96.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
107. The EC based its legal arguments on the territoriality principle: "the notion that a state
should restrict its rulemaking in principle to persons and goods within its territory . . . is a
fundamental notion of international law, in particular insofar as it concerns the regulation of the
social and economic activity in a state." EC Comments, supra note 5, at 893. In the case of foreign
subsidiaries, the EC argued that corporations are nationals, solely, of the state where they are
incorporated or have their registered office. As to goods and technology, the EC argued that they
cannot be seen as having any nationality. The American regulations thus exceeded the authority of
the nationality principle, which "exacerbates the infringement of the territoriality principle." Id. at
893-95. For an analysis of the EC Comments, see Lowe, supra note 3.
108. See supra note 107.
109. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 1964-I RECUEIL DES CouRs 1, 24-30
(Hague Academy of International Law).
110. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
111. The EC Comments argue that:
E.C. companies are pressed into service to carry out U.S. trade policy toward the U.S.S.R., even
though these companies are incorporated and have their registered office within the Community
which has its own trade policy towards the U.S.S.R.
The public policy ("ordre public") of the European Community and its Member States is
thus purportedly replaced by U.S. public policy which European companies are forced to carry
out within the E.C.
EC Comments, supra note 5, at 895.
112. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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trying to arrogate to itself powers which are usually given to national
governments-to determine what CGs should be produced and to levy taxes
to cover their cost' ' 3-but

which are inconsistent with the non-hierarchical,

decentralized structure of the international system,' 14 and are not subject to
the institutional controls normally placed on domestic governments.' 15
Europe also bases its legal arguments, then, on those "constitutional"
principles of international law, like sovereign equality and non-interference,
which support this basic structure.' 16 It resists what it sees as American
coercion with blocking statutes, like the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act,' 17 that raise barriers to foreign penetration around the formal
perimeter of the state.
V
THE INADEQUACY OF THE APPLICABLE RULES

The positions of both sides in the extraterritoriality controversy reflect
fundamental national interests; the American perception of free-riding and
the European perception of coercion give each position special emotional
force. Unfortunately, the legal doctrines available for dealing with such a
controversy appear inadequate for the task, at least in the short run.
This inadequacy is particularly obvious in the case of the territoriality and
nationality principles of national prescriptive jurisdiction, the "minimum
bases of jurisdiction," on which most commentators have focused. First,
those who would rely on these principles must deal with the words of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the S. S. Lotus. 118 The
famous dictum in this "Delphic judgment"' '9 would seem to allow the United
States freely to extend its jurisdiction abroad, so long as enforcement was
113. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114. This notion is implicit in the concept of a territorially-based "ordre public". See supra notes
107-08, 111 and accompanying text. The EC similarly argued that "the interest of the European
Community in regulating the foreign trade of the nationals of the Member States in the territory to
which the Community Treaties apply is paramount over any foreign policy purposes that a third
country may have." EC Comments, supra note 5, at 901. For a more general discussion, see Lowe,
suipra note 3, at 519 (public law is the expression of the will of a particular territorial political
community and should not be given effect outside the territory when it might affect the public order
of another territorial political community).
115. See Snidal, supra note 46, at 558.
116. The EC Comments argue (1) that each state, and the EC insofar as state powers have been
transferred to it, "has the right freely to organize and develop its social and economic system," and
(2) that the American regulations were "an unacceptable interference in the affairs of the European
Community." EC Comments, supra note 5, at 893, 895. See also Lowe, supra note 3, at 519-27
(territorial nature of public law expressed in international law as principles of sovereign equality and
non-intervention, as well as rules on national jurisdiction); Bridge, supra note 3, at 8-10 (exterritorial
jurisdiction must stop short of interference in proper affairs of another state; this notion is
encapsulated in principle of sovereign equality and duty not to intervene in any matter within
domestic jurisdiction of another state).
117. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 834
(1982).
118. France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (the S.S. Lotus case).
119. See Bridge, supra note 3, at 8.
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limited to its own territory, unless Europe could establish rules of
international law specifically prohibiting it.120
Although most commentators have rejected the Lotus dictum, 12 1 it
continues to receive support in the United States, 22 and even some European
scholars find the case to have authority. P.J. Kuyper, for example, notes that
the court explicitly dealt with the general problem of jurisdiction, not only
with criminal cases, and clearly separated (a) the extension of legislative
jurisdiction to acts outside state territory-acceptable except where
prohibitory rules of international law are established-from (b) the exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction-limited to state territory unless permissive rules
are shown.' 2 3 Ironically, Kuyper observes that the European Community will
probably rely on Lotus as the most authoritative pronouncement on the
12 4
subject in establishing the reach of its own rules.
Professor Prosper Weil suggests that those who criticize the Lotus decision
are attempting to "transcend" historical and political reality in order to
establish what they consider a better rule, one that will "'tame' the sovereign
power of states."' 125 Most of the time, he observes, one cannot trace a welldefined rule of international law on the subject, prohibitory or otherwise;
uncertainty prevails. Weil suggests, in a formulation similar to the Lotus
opinion, that this uncertainty could be seen as reflecting a permissive rule of
international law: States are permitted to apply their rules extraterritorially,
but other states are permitted not to recognize or give effect to such rules.
This formulation would accurately reflect the current situation while
providing a base for gradually strengthening the limiting rules of
26
international law. '

The Lotus decision and related theories, like that of Professor Weil, are a
far cry from the rigid territorial doctrine officially adopted by Europe. They
120. In the language of the court:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in
the territory of another state. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial .... It does not,
however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which
it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Far from laying down a general
prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and their
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, [international
law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain
cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles
which it regards as best and most suitable.
France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19. For a discussion of the Lotus case in a
similar context, see Kuyper, European Community Law and Extraterritoriality: Some Trends and New
Developments, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 1013 (1984).
121. See Mann, supra note 109, at 33-35.
122. See Small, Managing Extraterritorialjurisdiction Problems: The United States Government Approach,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 283, 291-92.

123.
124.

See Kuyper, supra note 120, at 1014.
See id.

125. Weil, International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 32-33 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984).

126.

See id. at 34-37.
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lend support to the positions of the United States, but seem likely to prolong,
rather than resolve, the debate over extraterritoriality.
Second, even short of the liberality of Lotus, there are those who hold that,
in today's complex and interdependent world, national prescriptive
jurisdiction should not be defined and limited by the rigid categories of
territory and nationality. These twin pillars of jurisdiction, derived from the
traditional notion of the state and traceable back at least as far as the
"maxims" of Joseph Story, 12 7 are put forward as the "minimum bases of
jurisdiction to prescribe law"'

28

in both the Restatement (Second)1 29 and the

Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law. 13 0 They also constitute the
3
starting point in most analyses of extraterritorial regulation.' ' Yet in his
famous 1964 Hague lectures, F.A. Mann pointed out that these absolute rules,
developed in an era of wholly different economic, social, and technical
conditions, when corporations did not play their current leading role in
32
international life, are unsatisfactory in the modern world. 1
Mann called for international law to liberate itself from the "shackles" of
the Story maxims.' 3 3 His approach called for evaluating claims of national
jurisdiction by assessing all legally relevant contacts between the state
asserting jurisdiction and the set of international facts it sought to regulate.
He would search for the existence of genuine links between the state and the
conduct to be regulated, assess the strength of the state's interests, and look
for the "center of gravity" of state contacts. 13 4 This approach is strikingly
similar to section 403 of the Restatement (Revised) in formulation, but quite
different in application.
Section 403 establishes the principle of
"reasonableness" as a secondary limit on state jurisdiction already established
prima facie on the basis of territoriality, nationality, or another basis of
jurisdiction. Mann's approach, in contrast, would use a flexible test similar to
"reasonableness" to determine the existence of jurisdiction in the first
instance. Mann expressly sought to depart from the rigid prima facie rules.
Because international law allows for concurrent jurisdiction, 1 35 whether
another state had equally close, closer, or the closest connection to the
conduct to be regulated would be relevant under Mann's test, but not
decisive.
It is not entirely clear whether Mann saw his approach as reflecting current
law, supported by the state practice he reviewed in his lectures, or as a
127. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824); J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 18-22
(1834). For a brief summary of the "maxims," see Mann, supra note 109, at 28.
128. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
129. The protective and universality principles are also accepted as bases of jurisdiction, see
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, §§ 402(3), 404; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 12, § 10, but are minor by comparison.
130. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 402.
131. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
132. Mann, supra note 109, at 37.
133. Id. at 43.
134. Id. at 44-46.
135. Id. at 49.
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recommendation meant for adoption in the future.' 3 6 Other eminent
scholars, however, have seen in Mann's approach "the master principle of
37
jurisdiction in international law."'
Mann's theory, like the Lotus opinion, would by no means allow
unrestricted exercises of national jurisdiction. 3 8 A reasonable relation
between a state and the acts it sought to regulate would be required; no abuse
of right or arbitrary action would be permitted; and jurisdiction would be
39
limited by the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states.'
Mann himself, moreover, did not apply his theory in ways that would give
much comfort to the United States. He opposed both "effects" jurisdiction in
antitrust cases' 40 and the assertion ofjurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries by
the parent corporation's home state.' 4' Still, Mann's theory is a flexible one,
and its essential elements-genuine links, reasonable connections, state
interests, and concurrent jurisdiction-fit comfortably with both the concept
of functionally associated resources and the interest of a state in limiting the
use of its resources as instruments of free-riding. The United States' position
on extraterritorial regulation, as analyzed here, can be much more easily
argued and supported under such a flexible test than under the rigid rules of
Again, however, like the principle of
territory and nationality. 4 2
"reasonableness," this flexible text is more likely to fuel the extraterritoriality
controversy than to resolve it.
Third, even if a state must in the first instance ground its regulations in
territoriality or nationality, as provided in the Restatement (Revised),' 43 I find
those principles broad enough to accommodate many forms of extraterritorial
regulation-although Europe 144 and most commentators 4 5 disagree. This is
so because the interests the United States is asserting, in an era of
multinational enterprises and mobile resources, are similar to those which the
principles were originally designed to protect.

136.
137.

See id.at 126.
Meesen, International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction, inEXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 38, 41 (C. Olstead ed. 1984).
138. The Lotus court referred to, without discussion, principles of international law that would
restrict national jurisdiction. Mann sees as one possible interpretation of Lotus that the Court was
seeking to depart from the absolutes of territorial and nationality jurisdiction in favor of a more
flexible approach, consistent with his own. See Mann, supra note 109, at 36.
139. Id. at 47-48. Mann saw the principle of non-interference as difficult to apply, however. For
further discussion of that principle, see infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
140. See Mann, supra note 109, at 104-06.
141. See Mann, Responsibility of Parent Companies for Foreign Subsidiaries, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 154 (C. Olstead ed. 1984).
142. The United States in fact argues that international law requires only a reasonable nexus with
the activities to be regulated; territoriality and nationality are accepted forms of nexus, but not the
only ones. See Small, supra note 122, at 292-93.
143. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 402 comment a.
144. See EC Comments, supra note 5.
145. See sources cited supra note 8.
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Regulation of foreign subsidiaries, directly or indirectly, under the
nationality principle has been debated for decades. 14 6
In general,
international law has established the state of incorporation as the
corporation's state of nationality for most purposes, although other tests of
nationality have sometimes been adopted.' 4 7 This test, plus the operation of
the subsidiary in its host state's territory, gives Europe strong arguments
against regulation by the parent company's home state.' 48 Yet the relevance
of the functional links to the parent's home state mentioned above can only be
denied by the most static- and reductionist-minded. Principle and state
practice both lead to the conclusion that foreign subsidiaries have links
analogous to nationality with both the host state and the parent's home
state.' 49 In most cases, moreover, foreign subsidiaries subject to American
regulation have extensive commercial links to the United States, both
generally and with regard to particular transactions, in addition to simple
ownership or control. 150 The subtle questions of when, and to what extent,
the parent's home state should be able to regulate the subsidiary where host
state policies differ from its own are not easily answered by a principle as
broad as "nationality," which was designed primarily for a different
context.

151

The Restatement (Revised) accepts the existence of dual links akin to
nationality.' 5 2 It tries to deal with the subtle questions posed above by
providing that the jurisdiction of the parent company's home state should be
"limited," must be "reasonable," and must only be exercised in "exceptional"
cases, defined primarily according to the importance of the regulation to the
146. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 8, at 17-20; Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REV.

588-92 (1969); Thompson, supra note 23, at 364-67;

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

Draft No. 6, supra note

14, § 414 comment a, reporters' notes 1-4.
147. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 216; Marcuss & Richard, supra note
8, at 17-19.
148. See EC Comments, supra note 5, at 893-95.

149.

See

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 414 comments a-b, reporters' notes

1-8; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 8, at 18-19 (While in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, the International Court ofJustice stated that no
test of corporate nationality based on links or "genuine connections" to a state had found general
acceptance, the court reviewed such links in deciding that a Canadian-incorporated entity had
Canadian nationality.); Thompson, supra note 23, at 361 ("Any attempt to resolve jurisdiction over
subsidiaries must begin with a recognition that, because of the transnational character of the
enterprise, the interests of two states are inevitably involved.").
150. See Small, supra note 122, at 286. The U.S. anti-boycott statute explicitly applies to foreign
subsidiaries only to the extent of their activities in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United
States. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2407(a)(1), 2415(2) (1982). This is sometimes seen as strengthening the United
States' jurisdictional claim. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 8, at 453; Steiner, supra note 102, at
1407 n. 298.
151. The concept is designed primarily to regulate the relations between states and natural
persons. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. 1, 23 ("[Nlationality is a legal bond having as its basis a
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

152.

See

Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 216 reporters' note 1.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 414 comment b.
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parent's home state.' 53 Because that state will make these determinations,
however, and because the Restatement would permit concurrent
jurisdiction, 54 the rule will lead to little essential change in the current
situation.
Even if direct nationality jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries were
limited, one should note, the United States could proceed almost as
effectively-as it often has in the past-by addressing its regulations and
penalties to the U.S. parent, or to American officers or directors, over whom it
has nationality and territorial jurisdiction. 15 5 Such indirect jurisdiction would
likely be resisted abroad.' 5 6 The Restatement, however, makes it easier to
justify than direct regulation.

15 7

As to re-export-type controls, the United States can argue that it is acting
territorially when it imposes conditions on the use of resources proposed for
export, 158 and that the territorial principle is meant to convey precisely this
right to regulate the use of state resources. 159 The Restatement (Revised) can
be read generally to support the U.S. position on re-export controls, although
it does so incompletely, indirectly, and somewhat tentatively, and does not
discuss the idea of restrictive conditions or any other rationale. 60 The lack of
a fuller or more definite treatment is disappointing, but it probably indicates
that the law on the subject is too unsettled for restatement, a point similar to
that being made here.
153. See id. § 414(1), (2)(b)-(c); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 7, supra note 11, § 403. An
earlier version of § 414, denominated § 418, provided that it was unreasonable for a parent
corporation's home state to regulate the activities of a foreign subsidiary so as to require conduct
that is prohibited, or prohibit conduct that is required, by the host state. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 418 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). This prejudgment
of the difficult question of reasonableness has been omitted in § 414. For criticism of the earlier
draft, see Thompson, supra note 23, at 387-92.
154. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 7, supra note 11, § 403(3) comment e; RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 414 comment d.
155. See Thompson, supra note 23, at 357-61, 363-65.
156. See Mann, Responsibilities of Parent Companies, supra note 141, at 155-56.
157. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 414(c) comment c.
158. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 8, at 40; Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of
Commerce, In re Dresser, supra note 5, at 48-49.
159. See EC Comments, supra note 5, at 893 ("The territoriality principle . . . is a fundamental
notion of international law, in particular insofar as it concerns the regulation of the social and
economic activity in a state."); Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of Commerce, In re Dresser,
supra note 5, at 48.
160. Section 43 1(1) of the Restatement (Revised) provides that a state may employ judicial or
non-judicial measures to induce compliance or punish noncompliance with its laws and regulations,
provided those rules were validly prescribed in accordance with §§ 402 and 403, including the
principle of "reasonableness." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 431(1).
Comment d illustrates the point with examples based on U.S. re-export regulations. The comment
states that "it might be reasonable for the United States to suspend the export privileges of a foreign
firm that had knowingly re-exported a strategic product of U.S. origin to a target nation in violation
of a prohibition, but that "it normally would be unreasonable" for the United States to deny the
export privileges of such a firm solely because it traded with the target nation "in the absence of
evidence that such trade involved goods of U.S. origin," since the United States would lack
jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to such transactions. Id. § 431 (1) comment d. See also infra note
167.
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The principal argument in opposition to the position of the United States
on restrictive conditions seems to be that even explicit private agreements
cannot confer jurisdiction upon a state to prescribe legal rules outside its
territory when international law does not confer it.161 While this may well be
correct, 16 2 the United States can respond that it is not prescribing law outside
its territory. Rather, it is imposing conditions within its territory, and when
those conditions are violated, it is suspending the ability of the purchaser to
participate in further exports from the United States or imposing other
penalties. In all instances, the United States is acting territorially. (Once
again, however, the actions of the United States have sometimes extended
beyond their rationale.
In the 1959 Raytheon case approved by the
Restatement, 63 for example, the order suspending export privileges
purported to prohibit all persons or firms, "whether in the United States or
elsewhere," from doing business with the British firms penalized for violating
re-export controls.' 64 The scope of denial orders like this should be limited
in a manner consistent with the territorial rationale and other appropriate
bases of jurisdiction.)
It might be noted, incidentally, that in other contexts governments are
permitted to establish restrictions on conduct in the form of conditions on the
receipt of benefits that they could not impose directly. Congress, for
example, can impose conditions on individuals, private organizations, or
states that receive funds appropriated under its spending power, even though
it might not be empowered to legislate such rules directly (under its
65
commerce power, for example).'
Consider finally the largely rhetorical point that the United States could, if
it wished, direct its citizens and other residents of its territory not to do
business with any foreign firm that traded with designated target nations.
Such a secondary boycott would raise other issues, 166 but it would appear to
be valid as a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction under the territorial
principle. 16 7 If that is so, imposing conditions territorially on the purchase of
161. See EC Comments, supra note 5, at 895-96 ("The existence of ... submission clauses in certain
private contracts cannot serve as basis for U.S. regulatory jurisdiction which can properly be
exercised solely in conformity with international law."). See also Lowe, supra note 3, at 519-30.
162. See Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administration Act, supra note 3, at 1325-26.
163. See Restatement (Revised) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 431 reporters' note 3.
164. See Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 24 Fed. Reg. 2626, 2627 (1959).
165.

See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247-50 (1978).

Such conditions may not,

however, violate the fundamental constitutional rights of individual citizens. See Feldman, supra note
8, at 274-75.
166. The United States has refrained, except in wartime, from imposing secondary boycotts,
Steiner, supra note 102, at 1368, and forbids U.S. persons acting in interstate or foreign commerce
from complying with foreign secondary boycotts aimed at friendly states. 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (1979).
167. A comment in the Restatement (Revised) suggests that it would be unreasonable for the
United States to deny export privileges to a foreign firm, as an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction,
solely because that firm had traded with a target nation, since the United States would not have had
jurisdiction to prescribe rules restricting such trade in the first instance.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 431 comment d. See also supra note 160 and accompanying text. If the
United States wished to implement a secondary boycott in the manner described, however, it could
argue with some force, under much the same territoriality analysis applied earlier to re-export
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U.S. resources and enforcing them territorially by denials of U.S. export
privileges-the penalty most commonly employed-should be no more
troublesome.
When resources are mobile, in sum, the concepts of nationality and
territoriality can readily accomodate regulation by the state of origin as well as
the state of current location. Subtle questions remain about the extent to
which a state may do indirectly what it arguably may not do directly, such as
imposing conditions on exports or addressing regulations to parent
68
corporations or the national officers and directors of foreign subsidiaries.'
The Restatement's "reasonableness" principle may be relevant to these
70
questions,1 6 9 but it is unlikely to resolve them as a matter of principle.'
Space does not permit a full discussion of the "constitutional" rules of
international law, such as sovereign equality, that Europe might invoke in
support of its position.' 7 ' These rules would be central under the liberal
dictum of the Lotus case 17 2 or Mann's flexible test ofjurisdiction, 173 and they
are also relevant under the Restatement scheme of territoriality and
nationality. Like the principle of "reasonableness," however, these rules are
too imprecise to resolve a controversy characterized by divergent national
interests and widely differing perceptions of the relevant political and
economic facts. Considerjust one example, the principle of non-interference
cited by the European Community in its 1982 comments on the pipeline
74
regulations. 1
The most complete statement of the non-interference principle, one with a
"specific economic focus,"175 is found in the 1970 General Assembly
Declaration on Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
controls, see supra text accompanying notes 161-62, that it was not prescribing rules for foreign firms
at all, but simply regulating with whom persons in the United States may trade, based in part on the
relations of foreign firms with target nations.
168. Doing indirectly what may not be done directly is the essence of Lowe's criticism of the
argument for re-export-type controls based on the consent of the purchaser. In Lowe's analytical
scheme, public law must be separated from private law (a distinction not as such recognized in
American law). Public law should not extend, should not even be given effect, beyond the territory
of the enacting state, if it affects the public order of any other state. This is a nearly pure version of
the territorial principle. "Submission clauses" contravene the territorial scheme; they are "the
saddle for public laws to ride on the backs of private contracts." Lowe, Public InternationalLaw and the
Conflict of Laws, supra note 3, at 525. See also Lowe, The Problems of ExtratenitorialJuiisdiction."Economic
Sovereignty and the Search for a Solution, 34 INT'L & COMP. L. Q 724, 735-36 (1985).
169. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 7, supra note !1, § 403.
170. Section 403, while requiring that any national regulation must reach some threshold of
reasonableness, clearly recognizes the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction. See Maier, Resolving
ExtraterritorialConflicts, or "There and Back Again, " 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984).
171. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
172. See Bridge, supra note 3, at 8-9.
173. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
174. See EC Comments, supra note 5, at 895 ("The [effect of U.S. pipeline regulations] is an
unacceptable interference in the affairs of the European Community.").
175. See Bridge, supra note 3, at 9.
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Nations.' 76 That document "solemnly proclaims," inter alia, that no state has
a right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of
another state; and, more specifically, that no state may use economic
measures to coerce another state into subordinating the exercise of its
sovereign rights or to obtain from it any kind of advantage. 17 7 The
Declaration also provides that every state has the right to choose its political
and economic systems without interference in any form by other states. 7
One can easily see how Europe,' 7 9 which views such extraterritorial controls
as coercion, 80 and the commentators supporting it,
181 might eagerly embrace
these provisions. They certainly lend weight to the European position.
Yet the United States can reasonably respond that, on.a fair reading, the
Declaration does not prohibit the kinds of extraterritorial regulation it
employs as part of its trade control programs. First, the United States is not
attempting to coerce other states into any subordination of their rights. It has
largely given up the direct efforts at coercion represented by the Battle Act,
and has almost never, in peacetime, tried to coerce foreign firms through a
secondary boycott. States affected by extraterritorial regulation, moreover,
82
retain all significant rights, including the right to block American controls.
Second, U.S. controls do not in any significant sense interfere with the
ability of other states to choose their political or economic systems, even
though they may interfere with particular transactions. Indeed, the states
most affected by American controls have largely market-oriented economic
systems, with wide latitude for action by individual firms. It is quite consistent
with such systems for firms voluntarily to agree to restrictive conditions in
order to purchase U.S. resources.
Admittedly, the Declaration's provisions on non-interference could be
read much more broadly than this. Overly broad readings, however, tend to
prove too much: At the extreme, they would prohibit any action that
produced negative externalities for other states, and this is clearly not the
183
nature of current international relations.
Even more fundmentally, the very principle of non-interference is deeply
ambiguous in a way that limits its relevance to the extraterritoriality
controversy. It is the essence of the "functionally associated resources"
176. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, GA Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (adopted, without vote, Oct.

24, 1970), reprinted in 9
177.

Id.

178.

Id.

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

1292 (1970).

179. See EC Comments, supra note 5, at 893, 895.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
181. See Bridge, supra note 3, at 9-10, 16-17; Lowe, supra note 3, at 522-23; Lowe, The Problems of
Ext raterritorial
Jurisdiction, supra note 168, at 740-43.
182. This is reminiscent of Professor Weil's position that international law permits states to
engage in extraterritorial regulation, but also permits affected states to refuse to give effect to such
regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
183. See Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in ContemiporarT International Law, 79 AM. J, INT'L L.
405, 406 (1985) ("As a legal proposition, such language is perfectly empty; for if read literally, it
would outlaw diplomacy.").
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rationale underlying U.S. controls that the regulation of important resources
is not always the "affair" solely of the state where those resources are located
at any point in time. In appropriate cases, it may also be the "affair" of the
state of origin. Allocating the "affairs" associated with mobile resources and
multinational enterprises among the interested territorial states is essentially
a political decision. Until it is made, the principle of non-interference will
remain only a form of words.
VI
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Perhaps the most significant fact to emerge from the pipeline episode is
that, at the end of the day, Europe has the physical power-supported in most
cases by the territorial principle' 84 -to block extraterritorial controls that are
costly or intrusive enough to make such action worthwhile. The United States
might see many blocking actions as unfair, 8 5 but it is almost unthinkable that
it would attempt physically to halt foreign transactions it had attempted to
control. To do so would violate what the Lotus case called the "first and
foremost restriction imposed by international law."' 8s 6 The United States
generally respects the superior power of the territorial state, and recognizes
the fruitlessness of penalizing the private firms caught in the middle, by the
principle of sovereign compulsion.' 8 7 Thus, the likelihood of another costly
confrontation like that of 1982 may be sufficient to convince the United States
to moderate the exercise of its claims.
Considerable moderation can already be observed. Perhaps most
noteworthy, the several trade controls imposed by the United States since
1982 have been limited in their extraterritorial effects. The best example is
the embargo of Libya instituted in 1986 under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") and special legislation, 8 8 building on a
184. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 436(2) comment b.
185. As noted above, supra text accompanying note 97, foreign firms may pay reduced prices for
goods or technology purchased subject to restrictive conditions, in which case the states of the
purchasers can be seen as giving up fewer resources in exchange for the resources its firms acquire
from the United States. Foreign government orders requiring completion of transactions utilizing
those resources, in the face of U.S. restrictions, can thus be seen as allowing both the firms and the
states themselves to reap unbargained-for advantages.
186. See supra note 120.
187. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) Draft No. 6, supra note 14, § 436(1). The United States deviated
from this principle briefly during the pipeline confrontation, see supra note 31 and accompanying text,
in part on the ground that the foreign firms involved had worked to procure the compulsion. See
Moyer & Mabry, supra note 2, at 71-73; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 30-38; Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385
(D.C.C. 1982)
188. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982);
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, tit. V, § 504, Pub. L. No. 99-83,
99 Stat. 221, (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349 aa-8 (Supp. III 1985)); Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed.
Reg. 865 (1986); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 1354, 2462 (1986); Exec. Order No.
12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1253 (1986); Restrictions on Exports Involving Libya, 51 Fed. Reg. 2353
(1986); see also Bialos & Juster, The Libyan Sanctions: .4Rational Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism, 26
VA.J. INT'L L. 799 (1986).
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partial trade embargo imposed in 1982.18() The 1982 regulations required
validated licenses or similar authorizations for exports and re-exports to Libya
of most U.S.-origin commodities and technical data and for foreign exports of
goods incorporating U.S.-origin parts, components, or materials. 190 They
also required licenses for foreign exports of locally-made products of U.S.origin technology, but this restriction applied only to items controlled for
national security purposes, only to prospective transactions, and only in cases
where written assurances had been given. 19 1 The stated licensing policy was
to approve most controlled exports and re-exports, except those items which
were controlled for national security purposes or related to oil and gas, and
which were not readily available outside the United States.' 9 2 Even with such
items, licenses would generally be issued, or at least favorably considered, in
re-export cases involving goods or technology exported before the embargo
or sales under preexisting contracts, and in parts and components cases
where the U.S.-origin content comprised twenty percent or less of the
9 3
value. 1
The 1986 regulations tightened these controls, but did not greatly extend
their extraterritorial reach. The new rules instituted a more complete
embargo on exports, but this was limited mainly to exports "from the United
States."' 9 4 They prohibited "U.S. persons" from performing most contracts
in support of projects in Libya' 9 5 and from engaging in certain extraterritorial
trade transactions, such as the purchase of Libyan goods for export to another
country. 19 6 "U.S. persons" were defined, however, not to include foreign
189. 47 Fed. Reg. 11, 247 (1982). The 1982 embargo expanded on earlier export controls
imposed for national security, antiterrorism and regional stability purposes. Id.
190. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(a)(1985).
191. See id.
192. See id. Licenses would also generally be denied for exports of goods and technical data for
the Ras Lanuf petrochemical plant.
193. See id. § 385.7(a)(2).
194. See 51 Fed. Reg. 1354 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 550.202). These new regulations
provided no exception for prior contractual commitments.
As originally promulgated, the embargo regulations prohibited exports from the United States to
a third country if the exporter had reason to believe that the goods would be transshipped to Libya
without being incorporated into manufactured products or otherwise "substantially transformed",
but permitted them if the exporter had reasonable cause to believe that the goods would be
substantially transformed or would come to rest in the third country, as by inclusion in inventory,
before shipment to Libya. See id. at § 550.409. This regulation was later amended to prohibit
exports to third countries whenever the exporter knows or has reason to know either (1) that the
exported goods or technology are to be transshipped without coming to rest and being substantially
transformed or incorporated into manufactured goods, or (2) that the exported goods or technology
are intended specifically for substantial transformation or incorporation into products to be used in
the Libyan petroleum or petrochemical industries. See 51 Fed. Reg. 22,802 (1986) (amending 31
C.F.R. § 550.409).
195. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.205 (1986).
196. See id. at § 550.204. The prohibition on performance of contracts "in support or' Libyan
projects, id. § 550.205, could be interpreted to prevent "U.S. persons" from participating in the
export to Libya from third countries of goods or technology destined for such projects. Individual
U.S. persons employed by foreign firms, including foreign subsidiaries of American firms, are subject
to this prohibition. See Ellicott, The New U.S. Embargo on Trade and Financial Dealings with Libya, 2 INT'L
Bus. & TRADE REP. 17, 18-19 (1986).
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subsidiaries or other affiliates. 19 7 Foreign branches-but not subsidiaries-of
American banks were made subject to the regulations freezing Libyan
government assets,' 9 8 but the freeze was limited to dollar-denominated
assets.'" 9 While the Libya embargo involves an extensive set of economic
sanctions, then,2 0 it does not have anything like the sweeping extraterritorial
reach of the 1982 pipeline controls, in spite of the prominent place occupied
by Libya in American foreign policy during 1986. Foreign subsidiaries are not
restricted as such, and while many re-export-type transactions require a
20
license, little third-country trade with Libya is actually embargoed. '
The 1985 IEEPA embargo of Nicaragua-another country prominent in
U.S. foreign policy-is even more restrained. It covers only exports "from
the United States either to or destined for Nicaragua," and thus does not
20 2
include even re-export controls.
In March 1987, the Reagan Administration relaxed U.S. controls on
foreign exports of manufactured products incorporating U.S.-origin parts,
components, or materials. 20 3 Under the revised rule, such exports to certain
specified destinations will be permitted without prior authorization if the
value of the U.S. content is twenty-five percent or less of the value of the
goods; they will be permitted to any destination if the value of the U.S.
content is both ten percent or less of the value of the goods and equal to
2 04
$10,000 or less.
This sort of de minimis exception has already been successfully applied,
almost always as a matter of licensing policy, notably in the embargoes of
197. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.308 (1986). Transactions involving a foreign subsidiary could in some
circumstances run afoul of the prohibition on transactions undertaken with the purpose or effect of
evading any of the embargo regulations. Id. at § 550.208. See Ellicott, supra note 196, at 17-18. In
July 1986, the Treasury Department imposed a reporting requirement on U.S. firms with foreign
affiliates engaging in transactions with Libya, designed to monitor compliance with the anti-evasion
rule. See 51 Fed. Reg. 25,634 (1986).
198. See Exec. Order No. 12,544 (1986); 31 C.F.R. § 550.209 (1986) (added by 51 Fed. Reg. 2462
(1986)).
199. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.516 (1986) (added by 51 Fed. Reg. 2462, 2466 (1986)).
200. Also included are restrictions on imports from Libya, 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.201, .407-.408
(1986), and travel to Libya, 31 C.F.R. § 550.207 (1986).
201. See Ellicott, supra note 196, at 20.
202. See Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985); Nicaraguan Trade Control
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 540 (1986). The export prohibition is set out in 31 C.F.R. § 540.205
(1986); see also 31 C.F.R. § 540.401(b) (1986). Exports to third countries are prohibited where the
exporter has reasonable cause to believe that the goods will be incorporated into manufactured
products or otherwise substantially transformed before shipment to Nicaragua. See id. § 540.406.
203. 52 Fed. Reg. 9147 (1987).
204. Id. at 9147-50 (amending 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1987)). Such exports will also be permitted if
the U.S. content in a single unit is of very low dollar value, if the U.S. content could be exported
under certain general licenses, or if the foreign exports meet any of the conditions for permissive reexports in 15 C.F.R. § 374.2 (1987). Id.
The value of the U.S. content is to be the delivered price to the foreign manufacturer, except that
fair market prices are to be substituted in sales between affiliated firms made at below normal prices.
The value of the foreign product is to be the normal export price FOB factory. Id.
The destinations for which the twenty-five percent limit is applicable are, with certain stated
exceptions, those listed in Supplements 2 and 3 to 15 C.F.R. Pt. 373 (1987).
Exports of foreign-manufactured supercomputers utilizing U.S.-origin components will continue
to require prior authorization. Id.
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Cuba and Libya. 0 5 Its inclusion in the general export administration
regulations, applicable even to items controlled for national security reasons,
represents an important change of direction for U.S. policy. The revised rule
does appear, however, to authorize a form of retroactive regulation: A
country could seemingly be removed from the list of approved destinations
after parts have been exported from the United States, subjecting exports of
the foreign-produced end product to the ten percent/$10,000 limit, rather
20
than the more lenient twenty-five percent test.

6

Within the Executive branch, the Department of State has worked to
develop a procedure for reviewing actions proposed by other government
agencies that would have extraterritorial application or might otherwise affect
foreign interests. Under that procedure, executive agencies must inform the
Department of State of any such proposed action and consult with it if
appropriate. This procedure is intended to help the government "manage"
the extraterritoriality problem by continuing to moderate the foreign effects
20 7
of its actions where the national interest permits.
This internal process is linked to an external commitment to moderation
negotiated in 1984, within the framework of the Organization For Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since 1976, the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises 20 8 have addressed the problem of "conflicting
requirements" imposed upon multinational enterprises by member countries,
including the regulation of foreign subsidiaries and affiliates by the
government of the parent's home country in conflict with the law or policy of
the state where the affiliate operates. 20 9 During the 1984 review of the
Guidelines, the United States joined with other OECD countries in issuing a
statement designed to strengthen international cooperation and avoid or limit
the scope of conflicting requirements. 21 0 The statement provides that, in
205. For a discussion of de minimis exceptions, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 133-34.
206. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9147, 9149-50 (1987) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 376.12(a)). Section
376.12(a)(1) requires prior authorization for exports from foreign countries of products
incorporating U.S.-origin components, and most of the exceptions in the revised rule are explicitly to
be applied as of "the time of export of the foreign-made product to the new country of destination."
See 15 C.F.R. § 376.12(a)(1)-(2) (1987). Unfortunately for the clarity of the revised rule, the quoted
phrase is not included in the paragraph establishing the twenty-five percent and ten percent/$ 10,000
U.S. content exceptions, see id. § 376.12(a)(3), but the sense of that paragraph appears to be the
same.
207. See Dam, Extraterritoriality,Conflicts ofJurisdiction, and United State Foreign Policy, supra note 4, at
21-22; Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, supra note 4, at 36; Small, supra note
122, at 290, 301.
208. See The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Annexed to the Declaration of 21st June 1976 by
Governments of OECD Member Countries on InternationalInvestment and MultinationalEnterprises, as amended,
reprinted in THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 16 (1986) [hereinafter
Guidelines]. See also Second Revised Decision of the Council on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
reprinted in OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 71-72 (1986)
[hereinafter Decision].
209. See Guidelines, supra note 208, at 11; Decision, supra note 208, at 7-9.
210. See Section on Conflicting Requirements, Endorsed by Ministers on l7th May 1984, fiom the Report by
the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on the 1984 Review of the OECD 1976
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in OECD, THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 75-76 (1986).
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contemplating exercises of jurisdiction which may conflict with the laws or
policies of another member state, OECD countries should: (1) have regard to
relevant principles of international law; (2) endeavor to avoid or minimize
conflicts through an approach of "moderation and restraint"; (3) take into
account the sovereignty and legitimate interests of other member countries;
and - of special interest after the pipeline case-(4) bear in mind the
importance of contractual obligations and the adverse impact of retroactive
measures. The statement also urges cooperative action as an alternative to
unilateral measures that may create conflicts, and includes a set of "practical
21
approaches" designed to stimulate notification and consultation. '
This statement is precatory on two levels: (1) it does not require states to
do anything, but only sets forth what they "should" do in particular situations;
and (2) the actions it urges states to take are only to "consider," "endeavor,"
"take into account," and the like. The statement refers to international law,
but does not characterize its content. It also relies heavily on consultation,
which will be of limited value when states hold deeply different interpretations
of a factual situation. It does, however, express a political commitment to
restraint, and that constitutes considerable progress so soon after the pipeline
confrontation.
Congress contributed to the climate of moderation by addressing the
problem of retroactivity in a 1985 amendment to the EAA. Under this
amendment, no foreign policy export control may prohibit either an export or
a re-export of goods or technology that is to be made pursuant to a
preexisting contract, or to any validated license or authorization under the
EAA. 2 12 This "contract sanctity" clause is aimed primarily at protecting

American exporters.2 13 By limiting the retroactivity of re-export controls,
however, it deals with one of the major irritants of the pipeline episode. 21 4
Contracts can only be "desanctified" under the amendment if the President
certifies the existence of a "breach of the peace" that poses a "serious and
'21 5
direct threat to the strategic interests of the United States.
All of this may suggest that the United States has learned a great deal from
the pipeline episode, and perhaps even that the longstanding controversy
211. See id.at 5-6.
212. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 9, § 108(1) (amending EAA § 6
to add paragraph (m), "Effect on Existing Contracts and Licenses").
213. For a discussion of contract sanctity clauses, including the legislative proposals leading up to
the 1985 Act, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 130-33.
214. The amendment does not deal expressly with retroactive controls on exports of products of
U.S.-origin technology, the most controversial aspect of the pipeline regulations. Presumably,
however, such controls would affect "the export . . . of goods'--by the foreign holder of the
technology-within the meaning of the statute.
215. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 9, § 108(1). The President
must also certify that the interruption of contracts or licenses will be instrumental in remedying the
situation posing the threat, and that the controls will continue only so long as the threat persists. Id.
This appears to have been intended as a fairly narrow exception, but in fact most of the trade
controls of recent years-like those responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the seizure of
hostages in Iran, and the support of terrorists by Libya-could be said to fall within the quoted
language.
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over extraterritorial trade controls has at last been resolved. The first of these

conclusions is probably accurate; the second, however, would be excessively
optimistic. The more closely one examines the post-1982 evidence of
moderation, the "softer" it appears.

Moderate trade controls can become

more extensive if they prove ineffective, as in 1982; the State Department can
be overriden; the OECD statement is too general to act as a real restraint; the
contract sanctity amendment to the EAA still permits some retroactive
controls, including any control said to be imposed for national security
purposes; and the Libya and Nicaragua embargoes serve as a reminder that
the IEEPA, which contains no contract sanctity clause, can also be used as an
authority for political trade controls.
The Reagan Administration's approach has been to moderate the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, out of comity or concern for U.S. commercial
interests, in particular situations, without yielding any of its jurisdictional
claims. 2 16 Congress, for its part, has done little to limit extraterritorial
regulation, in spite of the strong representations made by European
governments.
Given the consistent American claims of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the past thirty years, this reluctance to change course
dramatically should not be surprising. It means that, instead of a period free
of controversy, there may lie ahead a period of continued debate and
uncertainty, with the potential for periodic conflicts, until a true resolution
finally emerges.
VII
CONCLUSION:

A

NEGOTIATED SOLUTION

In an earlier article 21 7 I recommended that the United States and Europe
try to avoid the period of uncertainty and conflict just described by directly
negotiating the permissible extraterritorial reach of national trade controls in
particular situations. 218 This approach is still the most desirable. Recent
developments suggest, however, that the earlier article may have been too
sanguine about the prospects for success.
In spite of many brave words to the effect that the West "cannot afford a
repetition of the pipeline fiasco, a fiasco that damaged the Western alliance far
more than it hurt the Russians,"2 19 the only negotiated result since 1982 has
been the OECD statement described in the preceding section. The two sides
have brought quite different attitudes to the negotiations that have taken
216. See Dam, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts ofJurisdiction, and United States Foreign Policy, snpra note 4, at
21-22; Shultz. Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of nrisdiction, supra note 4, at 36; Small, supra. note
122, at 301. The new parts and components regulation was expressly presented as a way to "reduce
the disincentive to use U.S.-origin parts and components in foreign manufactures." 52 Fed. Reg.
9147, 9148 (1987).
217. See Abbott, supra note 1.
218. For another argument in favor of compromise, suggesting regulation of re-export-type
controls through a "rule of reason," to be implemented through bilateral or multilateral
consultations, see Feldman, supra note 8, at 274-79.
219. See Havers. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, supra note 4, at 24.
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place: Europe, especially the British, wishes to discuss abstract principles of
jurisdiction, while the United States favors the discussion of practical
solutions. 22 0 These attitudes may reflect not only differing national traditions,
but also the very different interpretations of the relevant facts the two sides
22
bring to the table. '
In addition, both sides have practical reasons-beyond the reasons of
principle discussed in this article-for being reluctant to compromise.
Europe presumably feels some confidence in its ability to block American
controls. The United States accepts the possibility of blocking, but knows that
foreign governments will attempt it only in extreme situations. 22 2 Europe
may well believe that resistance to American investment abroad in sensitive
sectors, avoidance of U.S.-origin components, and weakening of the national
treatment principle-among other responses to extraterritorial jurisdictionwill force the United States to retract its claims without negotiations. 223 For
its part, the United States is reluctant to restrict its freedom of action in the
intertwined areas of national security and foreign policy because of the
"primacy of security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the
arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and
has ... "224 Even in the area of pure foreign policy, the United States uses
economic sanctions to communicate its commitments and intentions, and it
may use extraterritorial controls to signal that it views a given situation as
meriting an extraordinary response; rules limiting extraterritorial reach would
interfere with this function. 2 2 5
In spite of these difficulties, however, there exist important reasons for
pursuing a negotiated solution. As this article has attempted to demonstrate,
both the United States and Europe have valid interests at stake in the
controversy. The interests of the United States include maintaining some
control over its resources, and resources associated with it, in order to
maximize its power and limit free-riding by other states as well as its own
multinationals. Europe's interests include resisting foreign coercion over the
use of resources that have entered its economy. Both Europe and the United
States, moreover, have at least arguably valid legal claims. Out of comity, 2 2 6

mutual respect, concern for the Western alliance, 22 7 and respect for the
220. See Small, supra note 122, at 288, 291.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72, 111-15.
222. The United States currently maintains, after all, both potentially retroactive re-export
controls, 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.1, 374.2(a), 379.9(b) (1985) ("at the time of re-export"), and controls on
exports by foreign subsidiaries, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.329 (1985) (one of many examples),
without foreign interference.
223. See Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, supra note 4, at 35 (such responses
make it "imperative" to "manage the problems of conflicts ofjurisdiction").
224. Jervis, Securitv Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357, 359 (1982).
225.

See D. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFr 243 (1985).

226.

The State Department views comity-something "between pure discretion and hard law"-

as the principle by which problems of concurrent jurisdiction should be resolved.

See Small, supra

note 122, at 291.
227. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 2, 63 Stat. 2241, 2242, T.I.A.S. No. 1964,
34 U.N.T.S. 243, 244, 246 (parties commit to eliminate conflict in international economic policies).
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principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, 228 these divergent positions
should be reconciled by negotiation, not through near-hostilities like those of
1982 or the application of political and economic pressure.
Second, a period of uncertainty and occasional controversy like that
forecast above would be inefficient and wasteful for both sides. International
transactions would have to proceedsubject to ambiguity and risk, increasing
the cost of doing business; international trade, technology transfer, and
investment would be distorted in anticipation of possible extraterritorial
controls and foreign responses, even when no such controls were in effect;
and political capital would be expended in controversy. Continued dispute
could "interfere seriously with the smooth functioning of international
2 29
economic relations."
Third, it may be important to reach a firm, long-term resolution of at least
some parts of the extraterritoriality problem during the current period of
moderation. Most government officials have short time horizons; because
they or their superiors must regularly be reelected, far-off events and
consequences are heavily discounted relative to those in the near future.
Future American governments may thus be tempted to try for short-run
foreign policy (or domestic political) gains by imposing extensive
extraterritorial controls, in spite of the longer term adverse consequences,
both political and economic, to the country. International rules and
agreements are often used to forestall such self-defeating actions by binding
successor governments, and the time seems ripe to apply this strategy to
230
extraterritorial trade controls.
Finally, as pointed out in an earlier article, 2 3' there exist a number of
compromise formulations, drawn from various functioning trade control
programs, that could allocate jurisdiction over common transactions in ways
that would respond to the interests of the United States and Europe, provide
increased clarity for international traders, and minimize the possibility of
costly international confrontations. The availability of these formulations
could give a running start to negotiations. As these formulations have been
illuminated elsewhere in more detail, the following are only a few brief
examples:
(1) At the least, whatever types of controls were permitted under a
negotiated regime should extend only so far as is consistent with their
supporting rationales. In particular, re-export-type controls should only
be permitted to the extent the conditions the United States purports to
impose on exports are clearly spelled out in advance and communicated
228.

See, U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 3; North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 1, 63 Stat. 2241,

2242, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, .34 U.N.T.S. 243, 244; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 176.
229. See Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, sapra note 4, at 33, 35.
230. For a discussion of the short time horizon problem and the use of international rules to
avoid self-defeating actions, in the context of protectionist acts, see Abbott, The Trading .Vation s
Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 521 (1985).
231. See Abbott. supra note 1, at 120-57.
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to prospective purchasers. 23 2 The United States might be well advised to
amend its export control regulations in this way unilaterally, to clean its
hands and strengthen its rationale, whether for negotiations or for
controversy.
(2) Prospective re-export-type controls might be permitted, retroactive
ones prohibited. 23 3 Even though the rationale of imposing conditions on
exports from U.S. territory logically supports retroactive controls, 23 4 they
are unpredictable and intrusive, coming into effect after goods or
technology have entered a foreign economy, and are likely to provoke
foreign blocking actions. The contract sanctity amendment to the EAA
constitutes a significant step toward this position, 23 5 and even before that
legislation was adopted the Reagan Administration had indicated its
intention to avoid retroactive controls. 2 36 A prohibition in the form of
an international obligation, though, might satisfy Europe more. The
form of a negotiated prohibition, moreover, would likely be different
from one unilaterally adopted.
(3) The recent de minimis exception for foreign sales of goods
incorporating U.S.-origin parts, components and materials, 23 7 could
serve as a basis
23 9

238

for a general negotiated limit on that form of re-export

control.
(4) Even prospective re-export-type controls could be required to
terminate at the point, to be defined, at which U.S.-origin goods and
technology have "come to rest" in a foreign economy. Such a
requirement would reflect an agreement that the predominant
"functional associations" switch at that point from the state of origin to
the destination state. 240 This "coming to rest" concept was incorporated,
in a slightly different context, in the Libyan embargo regulations. 2 4 1
(5) Foreign firms, both affiliates and independent firms, might be
subject to U.S. regulation when they participate in the "evasion" of
territorial American controls-a formulation that reflects U.S. concern
with free-riding-but not when they participate in bona fide
transactions. 242 The kinds of transactions that would constitute
"evasion" would have to be clearly defined, or else the term could
232. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
233. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 138-41.
234. See supra text accompanying note 96.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
236. See Dam, ExtraterritorialiY, Cotnficts ofJurisdiction, and United States Foreign Policy, supra note 4, at
18-19. The force of this statement is weakened by its connection to the administration's contract
sanctity proposal, which would have protected only those contracts under which performance was to
be completed within 270 days after the imposition of a control. See id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
238. David Small has suggested that a U.S.-content threshold as high as fifty percent might be
necessary to obtain European acquiescence. See Small, supra note 122, at 300.
239. For a discussion of de minimis rules, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 133-34.
240. See id. at 134-37.
241. See 51 Fed. Reg. 1354 (1986) (adding 31 C.F.R. § 550.409(a)(2) and amended by 51 Fed.
Reg. 22,802 (1986)). See also supra note 189.
242. For a discussion of evasion rules, see Abbott, snpra note 1, at 123-30.
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become a loophole for extensive American regulation and a new source
of controversy. The anti-boycott regulations adopted under section 8 of
the EAA 2 4 3 provide a basis, but only a basis, for a workable definition. An
anti-evasion provision was added to the foreign policy section of the EAA
24 5
in 1985,244 and one was included in the Libya sanctions regulations.
Yet for all the evident appeal of the evasion concept, there is little
experience with the actual application of any of these rules, and one
should proceed cautiously in relying solely on an evasion formulation.
(6) Foreign subsidiaries might be subject to U.S. regulation when they
are acting at the direction or as agents of their American parents, but not
when they are acting as independent foreign firms. 24 6 This formulation
responds directly to the United States' concern with free-riding by
multinationals.
(7) U.S. controls could extend to foreign subsidiaries only to the extent
those subsidiaries are engaged in U.S. commerce, as under the antiboycott statute, 24 7 reflecting the fact that the resources involved in such
transactions have multiple associations with the United States. 24 8 In most
cases, including the pipeline episode, the foreign subsidiaries reached by
American regulations do have multiple economic associations with the
United States, 24 9 even though the regulations may, by their terms,
require no other connection than ownership or control by U.S. persons.
Under the principle of multiple connections used in the anti-boycott
statute, however, those additional economic connections, such as the use
of U.S.-origin goods or technology, would have to figure in the particular
transactions subject to regulation.
Some of these limiting formulations could be unilaterally administered.
The United States could simply refrain, for example, from imposing
retroactive re-export controls. Many of them, however, might-if left to
unilateral administration-serve only to create new subjects of controversy.
As noted above, for example, an evasion rule could be interpreted by the
United States so broadly as effectively to nullify a negotiated settlement. Even
if the rule were applied in good faith, there might be disagreements about the
existence of evasion. *To deal with this kind of problem, a negotiated
settlement should include several administrative provisions.
243. 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (a)(5) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 (1985).
244. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, § 108(a)(3) (adding new § 6(a)(2)), 50
U.S.C. § 2405(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
245. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.208 (1986). The provision might extend the effective extraterritorial
reach of the embargo. See Ellicott, supra note 191, at 17-18. The Treasury Department has instituted
a reporting requirement designed to ensure compliance with the anti-evasion rule. See supra note
196.
246. For a discussion of agency rules, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 146-50.
247. See 50 U.S.C. § 2407(a)(1) (1982) ("with respect to his activities in the interstate or foreign
commerce of the United States").
248. For a discussion of the U.S. commerce rule, see Abbott, supra note 1,at 144-46.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
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First, the European governments should agree to cooperate with the
United States in gathering the information necessary to properly administer
the agreed substantive rules. This should be the case whether the rules are
based on evasion or on other flexible concepts like coming to rest, agency, or
U.S. commerce, or whether they simply require information located abroad,
such as the existence of prior contracts or the value of foreign goods
incorporating U.S.-origin components. 2 50 Second, the United States and the
European governments should agree to consult as to the application of the
agreed rules. Consultations might take place before a program of controls is
instituted, and should certainly take place when the particular application of
an agreed jurisdictional rule is challenged. Similar arrangements have been
included in certain agreements relating to antitrust enforcement. 2 5' Finally,
an additional dispute settlement procedure, perhaps based on three-person
panels, might be established to deal with disputed instances of regulation not
resolved by consultation. While such a mechanism would probably be
unacceptable in the current state of uncertainty, it could work well in
connection with a set of agreed jurisdictional rules.
In addition, the European governments would be expected to promise not
to interfere with permissible forms of American regulation, either by formal
blocking actions or informal measures, and to follow the agreed jurisdictional
principles in any extraterritorial regulation they might themselves promulgate
in the future. 2 52 Other concessions might also be obtained. 25 3 This kind of
agreement, coupled with consultations on the underlying political problems,
should allow us to avoid another "pipeline fiasco."

250.
251.
252.
253.

See Abbott, supra note 1, at 152.
Seeid. at 121-23.
See id. at 151.
See id. at 153-54.

